



TERRORISM

Fact Sheet

The Massachusetts Local Law Enforcement Administrative Survey

The Massachusetts Local Law Enforcement Administrative Survey (Law Enforcement Survey) was a product of the Executive Office of Public Safety's desire to identify the needs of law enforcement personnel across the Commonwealth. The survey consisted of 12 sections that collected general information on each police department's community policing structure, crime analysis procedures, terrorism preparedness, accreditation, conveyances, infrastructure, equipment, communications and information technology capabilities, personnel, training, and general comments. Three hundred fifty-one departments (351) received this survey; this document is based on the 346 responses received to date.

TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS

Law enforcement personnel were among the first responders to the September 11th attacks on New York City, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. As a key component of our national and statewide anti-terrorism efforts, it is critical for law enforcement professionals to be equipped with the intelligence and equipment necessary to prevent and respond to future terrorist attacks. In the months following September 11th, police agencies successfully met this new challenge by heightening awareness, increasing patrols, educating their personnel, and documenting procedures and protocols for preparing for and responding to various threat situations. In the months and years to come, law enforcement will be expected to continue to adapt to the challenges that face our nation by implementing new strategies that best respond to the current needs of our society.

The Massachusetts Local Law Enforcement Administrative Survey included a section on terrorism to identify the impact of the terrorist attacks on local police functioning and assess the existing operational, training and equipment needs of local police. Specifically, the Law Enforcement Survey asked police departments to specify how they were impacted by the terrorist events, to indicate if they had critical incident plans in place, and to identify any equipment or training needs that arose after September 11th.

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For additional information regarding the Local Law Enforcement Administrative Survey or the Massachusetts Statistical Analysis Center, please call (617) 727-6300, or visit us at:

<http://www.mass.gov/ccj>

IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11TH ON LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Police departments were asked how the events of September 11th specifically impacted their police departments' operations. Analysis of the survey results revealed that departments were impacted on many levels, with the majority of departments implementing multiple responses simultaneously. Of the 318 departments that responded to this open-ended question, 234 departments reported an increase in patrols around targeted areas and/or increases in general awareness during patrols. Sixty departments reported a marked increase in civilian calls regarding suspicious activity, such as unknown persons or anthrax scares, and 45 departments identified new training or response protocols (Table 1).

Table 1.

Reported Impacts of September 11th on Police Departments

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments^{a,c}
Heightened patrols/increased awareness	234	73.6%
Increases in civilian reporting, calls	60	18.9%
New patrol/response protocols, training	45	14.2%
Other impact ^b	43	13.5%
None, no change	21	6.6%
Need more personnel/personnel has decreased	14	4.4%

a. Note that percentages do not total 100% due to multiple responses.

b. Other impacts included increased communication with schools and surrounding police departments, etc.; high anxiety levels; information being distributed to community members.

c. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.

Using U.S. 2000 Census data, jurisdictions were divided into six population ranges to further analyze whether particular needs were localized within certain population ranges. Findings show that the majority of departments within each population range responded to the terrorist attacks by increasing patrols of vulnerable areas, often reservoirs and power plants, and by increasing awareness among their officers (Table 2).

Table 2.
Impacts of September 11th by Jurisdiction Size^{a,c}

	Less than 4,999	5,000- 9,999	10,000- 24,999	25,000- 49,999	50,000- 99,999	Over 100,000
Heightened patrols/increased awareness	67 75.3%	48 73.8%	64 68.8%	33 70.2%	18 94.7%	4 80.0%
New patrol/response protocols, training	9 10.1%	7 10.8%	18 19.4%	5 10.6%	5 26.3%	1 20.0%
Need more personnel/personnel has decreased	0 .0%	3 4.6%	4 4.3%	5 10.6%	1 5.3%	1 20.0%
Increases in civilian reporting, calls	15 16.9%	15 23.1%	19 20.4%	8 17.0%	1 5.3%	2 40.0%
None, no change	8 9.0%	3 4.6%	7 7.5%	3 6.4%	0 .0%	0 .0%
Other impact ^b	12 13.5%	7 10.8%	10 10.6%	11 23.4%	2 10.5%	1 20.0%

^a. Note that percentages do not total 100% due to multiple responses.

^b. Other impacts included increased communication with schools and surrounding police departments, etc.; high anxiety levels; information being distributed to community members.

^c. Percentages reflect the number of departments within each population category that answered this question.

CRITICAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PLANS

Local police officers are among the first on the scene of a terrorist attack. Therefore, the formulation of local critical incident management plans is crucial when planning for or responding to such events. Police departments need to have a comprehensive plan of action, including the training and equipment necessary for responding to an emergency situation. Of the 336 departments that responded to this question, 210 departments reported that they *did* have a Critical Incident Management Plan, while 126 reported that they *did not* (Table 3).

Table 3.

Number of Police Departments with a Critical Incident Management Plan

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments
Yes	210	62.5%
No	126	37.5%

^a. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.

Further, utilizing U.S. 2000 Census data, it was revealed that it was the smallest jurisdictions (4,999 residents or fewer) who were more likely to *not* have a critical incident plan, compared to all other population ranges, which *were more likely to have* a critical incident plan in place (Table 4).

Table 4.

Police Departments With Critical Incident Management Plans by Jurisdiction Size^a						
	Less than 4,999	5,000- 9,999	10,000- 24,999	25,000- 49,999	50,000- 99,999	Over 100,000
Yes	46	42	69	35	13	5
	45.5%	62.7%	71.1%	72.9%	72.2%	100.0%
No	55	25	28	13	5	0
	54.5%	37.3%	28.9%	27.1%	27.8%	.0%

^a. Percentages reflect the number of departments within each population category that answered this question.

COORDINATED MANAGEMENT PLANS

In addition to maintaining a local critical incident management plan, it is essential for police departments to have a plan for communicating with nearby departments in the event of an attack. Large-scale acts of terrorism will affect more than one jurisdiction, and responses to these events will need to be efficient and effective. Coordinated management plans allow departments to network their resources, share information, and determine the chain of command for these incidents. The Massachusetts Local Law Enforcement Administrative Survey asked police departments whether or not they coordinated with neighboring departments to develop management plans for terrorism response. Of the 327 departments that responded, 159 reported that they *did* coordinate with surrounding departments while 168 reported that they *did not* (Table 5).

Table 5.

Number of Police Departments with a Coordinated Management Plan with Other Jurisdictions

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments
Yes	159	48.6%
No	168	51.4%

^a. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.

Further, jurisdictions with smaller populations (under 24,999) were less likely to have a coordinated management plan, as compared to jurisdictions with higher populations (over 25,000). Jurisdictions within the 5,000-9,999 population range were the least likely to

participate in coordinated management plans (Table 6). The survey found that 55.3% of departments covering a population of less than 4,999 people and almost 64% of departments in the 5,000-9,999 category did not have a coordinated management plan, calling attention to the need for smaller departments to work with neighboring jurisdictions to develop plans for networking their resources.

Table 6.

Police Departments With Coordinated Management Plans by Jurisdiction Size^a

	Less than 4,999	5,000- 9,999	10,000- 24,999	25,000- 49,999	50,000- 99,999	Over 100,000
Yes	42 44.7%	25 36.2%	47 50.0%	29 61.7%	13 72.2%	3 60.0%
No	52 55.3%	44 63.8%	47 50.0%	18 38.3%	5 27.8%	2 40.0%

^a. Percentages reflect the number of departments within each population category that answered this question.

In examining both the responses regarding local and coordinated planning efforts, the survey found that a total of 94 departments reported having neither a local critical incident plan, nor a coordinated management plan. These figures highlight the need for more communication and joint planning initiatives among neighboring Massachusetts police departments.

EQUIPMENT NEEDS IDENTIFIED AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH

Police departments were asked to list specific equipment needs for law enforcement first responders identified as a result of September 11th. Of the 346 survey respondents, 240 departments answered this question, with numerous departments listing multiple equipment items. The most common equipment needs identified included: personal protection equipment against biological/chemical attacks (45.0 %), gas masks (36.7%), radios and other communications equipment (25.8%), weapons (13.8%), and mobile command vehicles (12.5%) (Table 7).

Table 7.**Specific Equipment Needs Identified as a Result of September 11th**

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments^{a,c}
Biohazard equipment, haz mat equipment	132	55.0%
Protective clothing; suits; gear; non-specific	108	45.0%
Gas masks/ face mask/ breathing apparatus	88	36.7%
Other equipment ^b	72	30.0%
Communication equipment, radios	62	25.8%
Weapons	33	13.8%
Mobile command vehicle, other vehicle	30	12.5%
Computer systems, laptops	21	8.8%
Protective shields/helmets	16	6.7%
None/ to be determined	13	5.4%
Gloves	13	5.4%
Night-vision equipment	13	5.4%
Hazard containment equipment; storage, lockers, bags	13	5.4%
Decontamination equipment	7	2.9%
Bomb detection/ protection	4	1.7%
Bullet-proof vests	4	1.7%
Boots	3	1.3%

^a. Note that percentages do not total 100% due to multiple responses.

^b. Other equipment specified included: surveillance equipment, medical supplies, electrical generators, riot/SWAT gear, etc.

^c. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.

TRAINING NEEDS IDENTIFIED AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH

Training for police officers is a requisite factor in their ability to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. Of the 346 survey responses, 222 departments indicated that they did have new training needs as a result of September 11th. The most common responses included training to respond to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (32.4%), general anti-terrorism training (29.7%), and critical incident response and command training (17.6% and 17.1%, respectively) (Table 8).

Table 8.**Specific Training Needs Identified as a Result of September 11th**

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments^{a,c}
Nuclear biological, chemical, weapons of mass destruction	72	32.4%
Anti-terrorism, general responding to terrorism	66	29.7%
Other training specified ^b	56	25.2%
Critical incident response	39	17.6%
Critical incident command/supervisor training	38	17.1%
Intelligence training (threat identification, terrorist ID, ethnic background understanding)	29	13.1%
Haz-mat response	25	11.3%
First responder training	18	8.1%
None needed	18	8.1%
Weapons, firearms training	11	5.0%
Bomb recognition/response	8	3.6%
City mobilization, crowd control	5	2.3%

^a. Note that percentages do not total 100% due to multiple responses.

^b. Other training specified included SWAT, emergency management, coordination with federal government, hostage negotiation, and vulnerability identification.

^c. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.

Specific Assistance Requested

Police departments were asked to provide additional comments regarding how the Executive Office of Public Safety could assist local departments in responding to future acts of terrorism. Police personnel work to protect the public on a daily basis, and their comments here reinforce their desire to continue to do so effectively in the event of another terrorist attack. The most common of the 204 responses included: training (52.0%), funding (23.5%), and a desire to have an effective method of communicating between federal and state levels of law enforcement in the event of a future attack (24.5%) (Table 9).

Table 9.

Specific Assistance Requested as a Result of September 11th

	Number of Departments	Percent of Responding Departments^{a,c}
Need training	106	52.0%
Need information dissemination/ communication among all LE levels and community	50	24.5%
Need money	48	23.5%
Need equipment	37	18.1%
Other comments ^b	26	12.7%
Need personnel	11	5.4%
Need state-wide policies	11	5.4%
Need shared databases among departments	4	2.0%

a. Note that percentages do not total 100% due to multiple responses.

b. Other comments included a desire to have more services available to western jurisdictions, information disseminated in a timely manner, the creation of a website and statewide task forces to assist in planning and response training. Please note that this survey was administered prior to the launch of the Secretary of Public Safety's Statewide Anti-Terrorism Unified Response Network (S.A.T.U.R.N.) program.

c. Percentages reflect the number of departments that answered this question.